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Reservations About Retribution in Secular Society 
Steven F. Huefner∗
INTRODUCTION 
Martin Gardner’s thoughtful article Viewing the Criminal 
Sanction Through Latter-day Saint Thought1 is an intriguing 
exploration of the intersection of western secular law, on the one 
hand, and concepts of eternal law contained in the theology and 
practice of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, on the 
other. It provides a fruitful opportunity for additional thought about 
the relationship between the criminal sanction and moral 
responsibility generally, as well as about the impact of Latter-day 
Saint (LDS) theology on justificatory theories of punishment. I am 
delighted to react to Gardner’s work and to offer my own 
observations and reflections, albeit from a jurisprudential perspective 
outside the immediate field of Criminal Law. 
Primarily, my aim is to explain why I remain skeptical of 
Gardner’s suggestion that Latter-day Saint theology justifies 
imposing secular punishment2 on a retributive basis.3 While I am 
sympathetic with Gardner’s sense that LDS theology and its 
emphasis on personal agency, accountability, and eternal growth 
strongly support the claim that moral wrongdoing deserves a 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State 
University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the LDS Perspectives on Law 
Conference, held at Brigham Young University on October 19, 2001. The author is grateful 
for the contributions of Joshua Dressler, Dixie Huefner, Christian Johnson, Val Ricks, and 
Gordon Smith. The views expressed in this Comment do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the 
Brigham Young University Law Review. 
 1. Martin R. Gardner, Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day Saint 
Thought, 2003 BYU L. REV. 861.  
 2. By secular punishment I refer to those punishments that an organized social 
community inflicts on individuals that it adjudges to have committed a punishable offense. My 
discussion herein is limited to western democratic societies, and focuses, like Gardner’s article, 
on the legal system of the United States. 
 3. As Gardner indicates, justificatory theories of criminal punishment are typically 
divided into two types: utilitarian (or consequentialist) and retributive. See Gardner, supra note 
1, at 861 & n.3. 
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sanction,4 I am unpersuaded that the theology sustains a retributive 
justification for secular societies to impose this sanction or to punish 
wrongdoing. Where Gardner suggests that secular or criminal 
“punishment is required in order that justice be done,”5 I would 
suggest that such punishments instead merely have the potential to 
facilitate the achievement of ultimate justice. 
My response will proceed in two parts. Part I will discuss what I 
see as some general theoretical obstacles to justifying secular 
retribution upon ideas in LDS theology. In particular, I will explain 
that largely because of society’s inherent difficulties in determining 
and meting out “just deserts,” I remain skeptical that secular 
retribution is required to do justice. While these difficulties provide 
arguments for rejecting retributivism independent of theology, I 
believe they resonate with principles of LDS doctrine and resulting 
ideas of ultimate or eternal justice. 
Part II will discuss specific aspects of LDS theology that seem to 
my mind to count against any requirement for secular retribution. 
Principal among these is the doctrine of the atonement of Christ, as 
a result of which each individual need not suffer the full 
consequences of personal wrongdoing. This Part will also respond to 
many of Gardner’s particular arguments from LDS scripture and 
statements of church leaders, arguing that, if anything, these same 
sources more strongly support a utilitarian justification for secular 
punishment. 
I. GENERAL THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RETRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 
To explain my lingering skepticism that LDS theology sustains a 
retributive justification for secular societies to impose criminal 
punishment, I will first describe what I understand “retribution” to 
mean. Next, I will briefly argue that retribution is both too broad 
and too narrow a justification for secular punishment. As a specific 
example, I then will discuss Gardner’s approach to the death penalty, 
explaining why his insights there pose broader problems for what I 
take to be his claim concerning the necessity of secular retribution. 
 4. See id. at 871–74, 877–81; see also Articles of Faith 2 (Pearl of Great Price) (“We 
believe that men will be punished for their own sins, and not for Adam’s transgression.”). 
 5. Gardner, supra note 1, at 861. 
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A. The Idea of Retribution from an LDS Perspective 
At the outset, it is important to clarify how I interpret Gardner 
to use the term “retribution.” In common parlance, we often hear 
the word retribution used to include revenge or “getting even.”6 In 
contrast, Gardner appropriately has narrowed the idea of retribution 
to exclude revenge and has defined it instead simply as the idea of 
“just deserts,” or as a “demand of justice” that must be met.7 In 
other words, one who commits a wrong therefore deserves to be 
punished. 
But why must this demand be met? Here, retribution seems to 
connote a cosmic or eternal “squaring of accounts,” or moral 
balancing.8 Gardner identifies two distinctive aspects of this 
 6. For instance, a TIME magazine essay on September 12, 2001, titled “The Case for 
Rage and Retribution,” argued for “ruthless indignation,” “focused brutality,” and “a 
wholesome and intelligent enmity” in response to the previous day’s terrorist attacks on 
American soil. Lance Marrow, The Case for Rage and Retribution, TIME, Sept. 12, 2001, at 
48, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,174641,00.html. 
 7. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 862. Gardner’s articulation of a “just deserts” 
justification of punishment argues that “punishment is justified, indeed required, simply 
because it is just” and that punishing wrongdoers therefore is “intrinsically good, independent 
of any beneficial consequences.” Id. In limiting his conception of retribution to this extent, 
Gardner is employing a classic formulation. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 
PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955) (describing the retributive view as justifying punishment because 
“[i]t is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer . . . . The state of affairs 
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does 
not; and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.”); GEORGE 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416–17 (1978) (“Retribution simply means that 
punishment is justified by virtue of its relationship to the offense that has been committed.”); 
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983) (describing 
the retributivist justification of punishment as the philosophy that “someone who has violated 
the rights of others should be penalized, and punishment restores the moral order that has 
been breached by the original wrongful act”); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 88 (1997) 
(“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient 
reason to punish him or her . . . .”). More particularly, Gardner appears to be employing what 
Jeffrie Murphy has called “character retributivism.” Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the 
Retributive Emotions, and the “Clumsy Moral Philosophy” of Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW 149, 153 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
 8. Gardner’s formulation of retributive theory contains no explicit reliance on any 
notion of eternal, cosmic, or universal justice. His approach is consistent with much 
contemporary retributivist thinking, which either “appeal[s] to little more than intuition,” Jean 
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1659, 1659 (1992), or else strives to develop an argument that punishment effectuates 
the wrongdoer’s reconciliation with society (or perhaps with the victim), rather than with the 
universe or God, see, e.g., id. at 1685–98. However, when developed in this latter way, the 
values of retributivist punishment might also be conceptualized in utilitarian terms, including, 
for example, punishment’s salutary effects of helping to build order and stability within a 
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reconciliation, one focused on making whole the larger community, 
the other focused on making whole the wrongdoer. First, he argues 
that punishment may serve primarily to exact from an offender “the 
amount of suffering deemed proper to pay the ‘debt’ owed society.”9 
But he also describes the importance to the wrongdoer of this 
reconciliation, aligning himself with others who speak of a 
wrongdoer having a “right” to be punished.10 Thus, through 
punishment, a demand is satisfied and a reconciliation is achieved, 
for the benefit of both the wrongdoer and the cosmos itself. 
Something is not right with the universe until a wrongdoer makes 
recompense,11 and so in some fashion pays a debt back, thereby 
bringing the wrongdoer, and in turn the universe, closer to God. In 
other words, retribution amounts to atonement and expiation. 
This view of retribution understandably “resonates” with 
Gardner,12 as well as with other LDS adherents, both out of faith in 
principles of atonement13 and because of the centrality to LDS 
theology of the concept of individual eternal progress. This theology 
certainly lends support to the idea that punishment is a “right” that 
each of us possesses in connection with our own wrongdoing, 
temporal community, improving the human feelings and relationships in that community, and 
satisfying the community’s need to express its displeasure about bad conduct. See Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). I have 
therefore chosen to link retributivism expressly to notions of metaphysical or eternal justice and 
reconciliation—a choice that also seems appropriate given Gardner’s, and this conference’s, 
enterprise of relating theories of law to LDS thought and theology. Otherwise, the retributivist 
claim that wrongdoers should be punished simply because they “deserve” to be would become, 
in the words of Richard Wasserstrom, “not an argument but merely an assertion.” Richard 
Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 328, 
337 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972). 
 9. Gardner, supra note 1, at 865. 
 10. Id. at 864–68. 
 11. As Rawls expressed it, “[t]he state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment 
is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not . . . .” Rawls, supra note 7, at 5. 
Or, in one of Kant’s formulations quoted by Gardner, “[i]f legal justice perishes, then it is no 
longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on this earth.” Gardner, supra note 1, at 863 
(quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Lodd 
trans., 1965)). I note, however, that this view seems potentially inconsistent with certain 
elements of LDS theology, in which mortal life can have value even under tyrannical 
governments or in a “lawless” society. 
 12. Gardner, supra note 1, at 870. 
 13. Most importantly, at the core of LDS doctrine is faith in the atonement of Jesus 
Christ. I briefly discuss the relationship between secular punishment and the atonement of 
Christ in Part II.C, infra. 
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allowing us to experience the consequences of our actions.14 Personal 
accountability, free will, and the related notion of eternal growth and 
progression implicitly include not only an openness to but also a 
need for true chastening.15
I concede that from this perspective I too share some (possibly 
paternalistic16) temptation towards retribution, and towards 
structuring secular society so as to enhance wrongdoers’ access to 
their “rights” to punishment. I also note that, from a theological or 
metaphysical standpoint, this defense of and inclination towards 
retribution may itself ultimately rely upon a utilitarian or 
consequentialist idea, albeit not one limited to the consequences 
flowing to secular society in mortality. In particular, what does 
Gardner really mean when he says that retribution is “intrinsically 
good”?17 Specifically from the standpoint of LDS theology, it seems 
that secular retribution might seem intrinsically good or attractive to 
us precisely because of the positive eternal results that it brings about 
and its therefore beneficial contributions to a divine system of justice 
predicated on individual agency and accountability. Nevertheless, I 
am skeptical that even these eternal justifications can be adequately 
translated to a retributive defense of a secular system of punishment, 
as I next explain. 
B. Secular Retribution’s Over- and Under-Inclusiveness 
Assuming that retribution embodies the idea that individuals 
both deserve and have a right to be punished for their wrongdoing, 
then I believe that Gardner’s account of it as a justification for 
secular, rather than eternal, punishment is both too broad and too 
narrow. It is too broad, first, because despite setting the burden of 
proof for criminal sanctions at the very high level of “beyond a 
 14. See Gardner’s overview of these ideas and related references, supra note 1, at 877–81 
and accompanying notes. 
 15. Cf. STERLING M. MCMURRIN, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
MORMON RELIGION 12–13 (1965) (describing Mormon conception of eternal progress as 
predicated on human freedom); Hebrews 12:6, 12:11 (“For whom the Lord loveth he 
chasteneth . . . . [Chastening] yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness . . . .”). 
 16. Paternalism is typically associated more with utilitarian theories of punishment than 
with retributive ones, in that a common purpose of utilitarian punishment is to reform or 
improve the criminal. On the other hand, forcing criminals to “enjoy” their rights to 
punishment, and thereby to become reconciled, strikes me as potentially just as paternalistic, 
and it is from this perspective that I admit to feeling an urge to make everyone whole. 
 17. Gardner, supra note 1, at 862. 
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reasonable doubt,”18 we as a secular society still do—and inevitably 
will—make mistakes and impose punishments on those who are 
wholly undeserving.19 At the same time, this retributive justification 
of secular punishment also is too narrow because we simply do not 
provide or even try to provide this “right” to be punished to all who 
deserve or merit it. On the contrary, in a variety of ways we have 
deliberately chosen not to attempt to do so, for instance by adopting 
the exclusionary rule20 and by prohibiting double jeopardy,21 in 
addition to using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof. 
These and related problems strike me as more than minor details 
if secular retribution indeed is necessary for justice to be done. For 
instance, Gardner explains that Herbert Morris would limit his 
retributive “right” to be punished to a legal system with certain 
safeguards, including requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.22 
But why should this particular procedural protection be required?23 
Of course it reduces those instances in which society mistakenly 
punishes the innocent; yet it also dramatically increases those 
instances in which society fails to punish the guilty, and thereby 
denies a huge number of wrongdoers their rights to retributive 
punishment. 
 18. This decision reflects society’s choice to favor other secular values—principally the 
protection of the innocent from the power of the state—over the satisfaction of the demands 
of retributive justice. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1406–09 (1991) (describing traditional criminal 
processes as using “innocence-weighted approach,” rather than either “guilt-weighted” or 
neutral alternatives); see also infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 19. See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1632–
33 (1992). The innocence projects that have sprung to life in many states in the last several 
years, following several high-profile capital cases in which DNA testing has subsequently 
proven the innocence of a wrongly convicted defendant, are but one recent manifestation that, 
even with our beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, we still punish the innocent. 
 20. To deter law enforcement officers from violating rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use in a criminal trial of illegally obtained 
evidence. For a summary of the exclusionary rule, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 377–422 (3d ed. 2002). 
 21. “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 22. Gardner, supra note 1, at 864 n.10. 
 23. It is not enough to say that society has chosen to protect the innocent in this way. 
See supra note 18. Instead, the question is, how has society made this choice, or why has 
society valued innocence protection above facilitating access to our rights to retributive 
punishment? 
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Gardner seems to acknowledge this imperfect correlation 
between deserved and imposed punishments, but suggests that doing 
“rough justice” will be sufficient.24 Yet as long as “rough justice” is 
adequate for a retributive theory of punishment, one could imagine a 
system that performed equally well or better—in other words, 
provided “just deserts” with an equal or lesser rate of error—but 
which convicted, for instance, based on a preponderance standard, 
rather than on a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Indeed, if 
retribution at the hands of the state is morally necessary for all 
wrongdoers, why not punish anyone who even arguably may have 
committed a wrong? Might we not thereby be doing them a favor?25
Similarly, what should we think of the exclusionary rule26 (and its 
typically utilitarian justifications) given its potential effect of denying 
a wrongdoer’s right to punishment and a victim’s right to 
vindication through punishment of the guilty? Or, to take another 
problem, should we favor an inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, 
legal system, if we aim primarily to provide wrongdoers with their 
punishment rights?27 Of course, these issues may simply reflect a 
reality that society today does not attempt to justify secular 
punishment primarily on a retributive basis, not that it could not or 
should not do so as a normative matter. But these questions also may 
suggest a difficulty in claiming that secular punishment is required to 
accomplish a necessary reconciliation or expiation between 
wrongdoers and God or the universe, for society certainly is not 
now, and is not likely ever to be, providing this right uniformly to 
wrongdoers. 
 24. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 887–89. 
 25. In other words, why could not a “rough justice” system for meting out retributive 
punishments be structured equally well as over-inclusive, or “guilt-weighted,” rather than 
under-inclusive, or “innocence-weighted,” to borrow Tom Stacy’s lexicon? Stacy has argued 
that our criminal processes would produce the fewest errors, and thus the most accurate 
distribution of retributive rights, were it neither innocence-weighted nor guilt-weighted, but 
instead neutral. See Stacy, supra note 18, at 1408. This argument seems to presume that the 
principle of retribution is zero sum, however, when such a characteristic might not necessarily 
be required. That is, although gratuitous suffering might be objectionable for a variety of 
reasons, it is not clear that it would necessarily undermine retributivist theory. 
 26. See supra note 20. 
 27. For an argument that an inquisitorial system better determines “absolute” truth, 
while the adversary system, in pursuit of additional values, settles for a “pragmatic” truth, 
which may more easily result in letting wrongdoers avoid criminal responsibility, see Matthew 
T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence 
in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 187–89 (2002). 
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Furthermore, even where society does succeed in identifying the 
truly culpable, it simply cannot determine what would be, for 
purposes of some metaphysical or eternal account-squaring, the 
appropriate or “deserved” quality and quantity of secular 
punishment.28 Rather, in almost every case, the particular 
punishment that society chooses to impose is sure to be either too 
harsh or too lenient to reconcile the cosmic balance sheet properly.29 
To the extent that we again would respond by accepting secularly 
imposed punishments as providing only “rough justice,”30 or as the 
first approximations of some ultimate eternal “just deserts,” it seems 
that we would need some additional justificatory theory.31 Indeed, in 
contrast to the idea of a “just desert,” what would seem to underlie 
this much cruder secular version of retribution is what we might call 
the idea of an “almost-just desert,” an idea with something of an 
oxymoronic quality. 
These concerns about retributivism are not meant to suggest that 
utilitarian justifications alone are sufficient for criminal sanctions, or 
that society can ignore issues of culpability in meting out 
punishment. Otherwise, society might deliberately punish individuals 
who in fact are morally blameless simply to frighten others into 
 28. That, of course, is a judgment for the eternities, and one that seems intimately 
connected to the idea of the atonement. See infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. It is 
not a judgment for which our mortal societies and institutions are well-suited. Accordingly, 
Hart called this “the most perplexing feature” of a retributive justification of punishment. 
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 233 (1968); see also Dolinko, supra note 
19, at 1635–42 (discussing the difficulty of determining truly “deserved” punishment, and 
dismissing retributivist efforts to impose merely “proportional” punishment, instead, as both 
inadequate and corroborative of underlying flaw); Murphy, supra note 7, at 157–59 (arguing 
that because we lack true understanding of the extent to which wrongdoers deserve 
punishment, “we act recklessly in inflicting misery on people as the suffering they deserve for 
their inner wickedness”). 
 29. Sentencing guidelines, death penalty qualification factors, and the like are all efforts 
to tailor punishments to fit the crime. Likewise, diminished capacity and other defenses operate 
in theory to spare penalizing the truly “undeserving.” But ultimately these and other measures 
are only crude and imperfect tools of matching punishments with culpability. See supra note 
28. 
 30. Gardner, supra note 1, at 888–89. 
 31. This problem seems inherent in retributivism even if we adopt a version, such as that 
which Gardner attributes to Stephen Morse, see id. at 884, that purports only to require a 
proportionally “deserved” punishment, rather than a punishment absolutely and invariably 
fixed as the amount deserved for a specific wrongdoing. Even here, our inability to determine 
true moral culpability, given our inability to judge the hearts and minds of wrongdoers, 
renders us unable adequately to determine desert. 
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compliance with authority.32 An adequate justification of secular 
punishment still requires a meaningful if imperfect effort to establish 
“blameworthiness.”33 But even from an LDS perspective of the 
eternal importance of personal accountability, the principle of 
blameworthiness also does not alone justify secular punishment, 
absent the practical benefits flowing to society from the criminal 
justice system and its sanctioning of wrongdoing.34
C. The Death Penalty: Only One Example of  
the Problem of “Rough Justice” 
The preceding skepticism about the claim that LDS theology 
supports a retributive justification for secular punishment derives 
partly from the same reasons that Gardner identifies in the section of 
his article articulating opposition to the death penalty. As he explains 
it, “[m]oral culpability is . . . a subjective state” that for its 
determination requires “the ability to ‘search people’s minds,’” a 
 32. This is a classic critique of pure utilitarian justifications of punishment. See, e.g., id. at 
866 n.15 (quoting a passage from C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES 
JUDICATAE 224, 227–28 (1953)). Such a system of course would be fraught with the danger 
of being exposed as a sham, in which individual conduct had no correlation with punishment 
or consequence, and hence would lose all its utilitarian value. It is also objectionable on 
broader grounds as well. See infra note 33. 
 33. Punishment without culpability would strike us all as a gross injustice, whether out 
of its inconsistency with ideas of retributive justice, out of its inconsistency with the aims of 
utilitarian justice, or, even more generally, out of a sense that any enlightened society must 
protect individual rights and freedoms from arbitrary exercises of state power. See, e.g., 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 65–69 (1968); HART, supra 
note 28, at 10–13; KANT, supra note 11, at 100 (as quoted in Gardner, supra note 1, at 863 & 
n.6). The idea that society should punish only the deserving does not necessarily imply that the 
sole or even primary justification for secular punishment should be to mete out “just deserts.” 
Rather, many theorists now follow Hart in distinguishing between retribution in the 
distribution of punishment and retribution in the justification for punishment. See, e.g., HART, 
supra note 28, at 9; 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 160 (1988); see also Gardner, supra note 1, at 862 n.5, 868 n.21 
(noting that some retributive theories other than the ones on which his article focuses may 
claim only that retribution is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for punishment). In 
this regard, I am employing what some have variously called a “mixed theory” or a theory of 
“negative” retribution, while Gardner employs a version of “pure” or “positive retribution,” in 
which blameworthiness alone justifies punishment. See Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: 
How Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451–53 (1990). 
 34. Furthermore, these benefits in theory could include satisfying the need for 
retribution, or even for vengeance, felt by some members of society. See, e.g., Robinson & 
Darley, supra note 8, at 454 (“[C]riminal law based on the community’s perceptions of just 
desert is, from a utilitarian perspective, the more effective strategy for reducing crime.”). 
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process “unattainable in earthly tribunals.”35 When we implement a 
system of capital punishment, he continues, we “risk the injustice of 
executing those . . . not sufficiently culpable,” as well as those who 
are “totally innocent.”36 Because retributivism, when properly 
conceived, “‘allows life to be taken only when death is deserved,’”37 
society lacks the ability to ensure that the death penalty is imposed 
with an adequate retributive justification. 
Why don’t these same concerns apply to any secular punishment? 
That death is a punishment different in kind does not seem to be an 
adequate response to these core issues about the underlying 
justification of any punishment at all. Doesn’t retributivism require 
that, for its proper imposition, any punishment be deserved? Gardner 
acknowledges that this question merits extensive discussion, but 
suggests that being content with “rough justice” will ultimately 
provide a sufficient basis for a distinction.38
Although I am content to tolerate (or even embrace) the idea of 
“rough justice” in our secular social order, I do so for utilitarian 
reasons.39 But I find it difficult to rely on this practical 
accommodation as a basis for a retributive theory of secular 
punishment. Doesn’t a properly conceived theory of retributivism 
require us to eschew undeserved punishments generally? If so, then 
on what basis do we allow our uncertainty regarding one’s ultimate 
desert to dissuade us only from imposing one particular kind of 
punishment, but not another? Certainly as a kind of punishment 
death may be different, but not in a way that eliminates the 
fundamental problem of imposing undeserved punishment in the 
name of achieving “just deserts.” Rough justice may be—in fact 
certainly is—“the best our [secular] legal system can ever achieve,”40 
 35. Gardner, supra note 1, at 884 (quoting Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: 
An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 
1183 (1981)). 
 36. Id. at 885. 
 37. Id. at 886 (quoting Lempert, supra note 35, at 1183). 
 38. See id. at 887–89. 
 39. Namely, with culpability still a predicate, see supra notes 32–34 and accompanying 
text, but with processes heavily weighted towards innocence protection, see supra note 18, we 
do our best to determine who has committed a crime and then impose punishment because of 
the resulting benefits. And while we yet should want our punishments to be proportional to 
the crime, see infra note 62, we need not attempt the impossible task of discerning precisely 
what kind or amount of punishment will fully reconcile the wrongdoing. 
 40. Gardner, supra note 1, at 888. 
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but to me this suggests that we need a justificatory theory for rough 
justice other than retribution, with its eternal, cosmic, universal 
weight and implications.41 Otherwise, the idea of “rough retributive 
justice” will inherently give rise to precisely the types of problems of 
both over- and under-inclusiveness described in Part I.B above. 
II. LDS THEOLOGY AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SECULAR 
PUNISHMENT 
The preceding more general reflections now bring me to a few 
observations about the justification of secular punishment drawn 
from specific details of LDS theology. First, I will raise a question 
about the retributive efficacy, from an eternal standpoint, of secularly 
coerced punishments. Second, I will express a thought about proxy 
punishments. In turn, this will lead into a brief but essential 
discussion of the atonement of Christ as a basis for skepticism about 
the necessity of secular retribution. Finally, I will respond to the 
particular scriptural and historical references in Gardner’s article. 
A. Secular Retribution from an Eternal Perspective 
The LDS doctrine of eternal progression gives rise to a demand 
that we both learn from and make amends for our mistakes. This 
demand of justice undeniably has a retributivist flavor. But the 
doctrine of eternal progression does not suggest to me that we 
should depend upon, or even expect, secular society to be the 
moving cause for the imposition of retributive justice. On the 
contrary, it seems to me that individual wrongdoers are expected to 
seek to vindicate their “rights” to punishment voluntarily. 
In the eternal scheme, one need not be found guilty by a secular 
court in order to be either obligated or able to pay retribution. In 
part, this is because of a lack of congruence between spiritual sin and 
crime. Obviously it also is because of the imperfect ability of courts 
to convict actual wrongdoers.42 And it is also because, in some 
 41. For extensive arguments that retributive justifications fail on their own terms, see 
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 843 (2002), and Dolinko, supra note 19. 
 42. See supra text accompanying notes 18–27. 
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circumstances, a contrite wrongdoer may pay retribution without the 
involvement of secular authority.43
Of course, a wrongdoer can confess and thereby eliminate the 
possibility that our secular courts will fail to convict. Indeed, 
ecclesiastical confession seems clearly the preferred predicate for 
retribution in LDS theology: wrongdoing leads first to remorse, 
followed by confession to God, to wronged individuals, and, where 
appropriate, to church authorities.44 In addition, the wrongdoer then 
is expected both to forsake the misconduct and to make restitution 
where possible,45 including accepting whatever secular punishment 
society imposes. This is all part of the process by which individuals 
“pay the price” for their errors, and take responsibility on an 
ongoing basis for “participat[ing] in their own salvation.”46
But where confession, and, in turn, true remorse or contrition, 
are lacking, how “intrinsically good”47 can coerced retribution be? 
Does true expiation for individual wrongdoing need to be self-
initiated, or at least voluntary, rather than forced? Perhaps forced 
expiation can occasionally cause the self-reflection that leads to 
remorse and, ultimately, to strengthened character and eternal 
growth, but this is by no means its natural or inevitable result.48
From the standpoint of LDS theology, and the preeminent role 
therein of individual agency and accountability, why should secular 
society force punishments on those who place no value on their own 
rights to receive punishment? Here, utilitarian justifications certainly 
 43. It is not clear that LDS theology in all instances requires a person who commits a 
minor but chargeable crime—for instance, shoplifting or criminal trespass—to submit to 
secular authority, provided the wrongdoer has made full restitution and genuinely repented. 
 44. For a contemporary introduction to church doctrine concerning repentance, see 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, GOSPEL PRINCIPLES 122–27 (1992) 
[hereinafter GOSPEL PRINCIPLES]. Of course, ecclesiastical confession is distinct from secular 
confession; and while in many instances the first may lead to the second, this seems by no 
means always necessary, as suggested above. See supra note 43. 
 45. See id. at 124–25. 
 46. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 880. 
 47. Here, I am referring to my previously expressed sense that from an LDS perspective 
principles of retributive punishment may seem inherently good because of their beneficial 
impact on a wrongdoer’s eternal development. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 48. Nor does forced expiation have a happy history. Indeed, in furtherance of just such 
expiation, and in seeking the “intrinsic goodness” of doing justice, many societies and cultures 
have engaged, for instance, in burnings at the stake or have compelled certain conduct or even 
have compelled belief. Within the Christian tradition, some of the most obvious of these events 
would include the Spanish Inquisition and the prosecution of Galileo Galilei for the heresy of 
subscribing to the Copernican view of the solar system. 
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spring to mind, including some related to the theology of eternal 
progression and individual agency. For instance, deterrent effects of 
secular punishment may keep individuals from wrongdoing until 
their own character has developed to the point of independently 
causing them to avoid it. Or, secular punishment may serve to 
incapacitate one whose actions otherwise would seriously impinge on 
the freedom of others.49 But when wrongdoers are not ready to be 
reconciled, it is much less clear that a retributive theory of secular 
punishment will achieve any eternal aspirations we may have for it. 
B. Proxy Punishment 
From an LDS perspective, a “rights” theory of punishment 
seems especially apt when a wrongdoer voluntarily seeks to vindicate 
these rights as part of an ongoing self-improvement process. What, 
then, of one whose remorse for wrongdoing and whose voluntary 
desire to be reconciled come too late for retribution through secular 
punishment? This might happen because of a statute of limitations 
problem,50 but consider the more interesting case of one whose 
remorse occurs after death. Is there still eternal progress for the 
secularly unpunished, and therefore unretributed? 
LDS theology certainly holds out the hope that, through the 
performance of vicarious ordinances of salvation, some who repent 
after this life may still experience many of the blessings of having 
lived a penitent life in mortality.51 Accordingly, if we believe that 
 49. In addition, some have argued that punishments may have instructive moral value 
even for the unrepentant wrongdoer. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of 
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984) (arguing that the primary purpose of 
punishment is to teach wrongdoers moral bases for choosing not to commit offenses). 
 50. This is but another example of the way in which secular retribution may be too 
narrow. See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text. 
 51. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 255–57; 1 Peter 4:6; 1 Corinthians 
15:29. The LDS doctrine of baptism for the dead provides for the performance by proxy of the 
ordinance of baptism on behalf of those who would have embraced the gospel during their 
mortal life had they had the opportunity to do so. Although it also has elements of a “second 
chance” for those who rejected the gospel in mortality or who willfully refused the opportunity 
to repent, such individuals may not fully benefit from vicarious baptism. Nonetheless, 
consistent with the broadest application of the doctrine, there may be many individuals who 
did not repent in this life only because of their lack of knowledge concerning gospel teachings. 
See Doctrine & Covenants 138:31–35. Moreover, the gospel teaches that those who embrace 
its teachings in this life thereby become obligated to continually evaluate their conduct and 
repent as necessary. Presumably, some beneficiaries of the practice of baptism for the dead 
could also have benefited from this ongoing post-baptism repentance process, had they 
embraced the gospel in mortality. It is in this light that I reflect here on the hypothetical 
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secular punishment is required in order that justice be done, then 
just as LDS theology has room for vicarious baptisms for the dead, it 
seems that it might also have room for the idea of vicarious 
punishments “for the dead.” That the doctrine of baptism for the 
dead in fact does not include any corollary principle of proxy 
punishment provides a simple demonstration that in LDS theology 
whatever punishment is required need not come at the hands of 
secular authorities in mortality. Rather, LDS theology has no 
principle of “punishments for the dead” per se because at the very 
heart of LDS theology is the doctrine of the atonement. 
C. The Atonement 
Central to my thinking about the implications of LDS theology 
on the justification of secular punishment is the doctrine of Christ’s 
atonement. The atonement amounts to a vicarious punishment on 
behalf of every one of us, if we avail ourselves, for all of our 
wrongdoing.52 Through the atonement, the retribution that is 
required of each of us for our individual wrongdoing is essentially 
spiritual,53 leading to a reconciliation with God that then will permit 
the atonement to operate in our lives to accomplish whatever further 
cosmic balancing eternal justice requires for our individual 
wrongdoing. 
Admittedly, LDS theology suggests that “[e]very man must 
answer for his own sins” and that “salvation can come only through 
possibility of vicarious punishments as well, on behalf of those whose repentance for mortal 
wrongdoing does not occur until after their stay in mortality has concluded. 
 52. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 73–78. As a result of the atonement, the 
idea of “punishment for the dead” becomes wholly superfluous, because a baptism for the dead 
then cleanses the beneficiary’s slate of all mortal wrongdoing. 
 53. See, e.g., 2 Corinthians 7:9–11 (describing the notion of “godly sorrow,” which 
“worketh repentance to salvation”). Suggestive of this spiritual retribution or suffering is 
Michael Moore’s description, recounted by Gardner, of the “extreme culpability” and 
“sickness unto death” one ought to feel at committing a horrible crime. See Gardner, supra 
note 1, at 868–69 (quoting Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 80–81 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999)). However, this passage 
also suggests to me the possibility that this spiritual suffering may itself be not only necessary 
but also sufficient for the demands of eternal justice, regardless of whether society ever satisfies 
the guilty person’s felt need that society impose an “extraordinarily severe punishment.” Id. at 
869 (quoting Moore, supra, at 82). For a critique of Moore’s argument from hypothesized 
guilt, see Murphy, supra note 7. 
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obedience to law”54 (in contrast to theologies in which salvation 
comes through faith alone). Yet the personal accountability inherent 
in this formulation does not necessarily provide a basis for 
concluding that secular punishments should be justified retributively. 
Rather, consistent with this formulation, individuals can be forgiven 
for their wrongdoing through the process of repentance, thereby 
achieving that union of justice and mercy described by C.S. Lewis 
and others.55 While the repentance process may include elements of 
both spiritual and temporal or physical suffering for the wrongdoing, 
it is not clear that some temporal or secular punishment is always a 
necessary component of the repentance process by which a person 
“answers” for sin and partakes of the atonement.56
Therefore, it seems to me a mistake to expect that our system of 
secular justice should impose, even as a matter of “rough justice,” a 
punishment that is in essence commensurate with our wrongdoing. 
From the standpoint of LDS theology, such an effort seems 
inherently flawed. The atonement teaches us that we cannot and 
need not literally repay in full the debts that we incur for our 
mistakes, and that we instead may answer for our misdeeds in other 
ways. We therefore may hope for secular punishments that are in fact 
proportionate to our wrongdoing, but only as a facilitative 
component of our eternal growth, rather than as a necessary 
component of eternal retribution.57 In particular, bearing even a 
token measure of blame for our misconduct may have an instructive 
value to us, helping us to internalize the consequences of our 
choices.58 But one who feels remorse and seeks expiation may not 
necessarily need a secular punishment in order that justice be done. 
 54. MCMURRIN, supra note 15, at 90; see also Articles of Faith 2 (Pearl of Great Price) 
(“We believe that men will be punished for their own sins, and not for Adam’s transgression.”). 
 55. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 867 (quoting C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of 
Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 229–30 (1953); id. at 875–76 (quoting Neal A. Maxwell, 
Jesus, the Perfect Mentor, ENSIGN, Feb. 2001, at 8, 12). 
 56. For additional discussions of the doctrine of the atonement in LDS theology, see 
MCMURRIN, supra note 15, at 82–90; GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 71–78. 
 57. Consistent with this view that secular punishments are not required to fulfill the 
demands of eternal justice is the church’s repudiation of the doctrine of “blood atonement,” 
which Gardner has previously described. See Martin R. Gardner, Mormonism and Capital 
Punishment: A Doctrinal Perspective, Past and Present, DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, 
Spring 1979, at 9, 16–22. 
 58. Cf. Hampton, supra note 49 (arguing that the primary purpose of punishment is to 
teach the wrongdoers moral bases for choosing not to commit offenses). 
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D. Utilitarian Aspects of Specific LDS Statements  
Concerning Punishment 
Partly from the preceding thoughts, I read pertinent LDS 
scriptural references concerning punishment, as well as particular 
statements of church authorities on the subject, to support a 
utilitarian theory of punishment at least as much as, if not more than, 
they support retributive theory. These statements include the same 
scriptural passages that Gardner analyzes, and the same statements he 
cites from contemporary church authorities and early church 
President Brigham Young. In addition, the prophet Joseph Smith 
expressed a remarkably clear utilitarian view of secular punishment. 
For instance, the expression in section 134 of the Doctrine & 
Covenants59 that wrongdoers “should be punished according to their 
criminality and their tendency to evil among men,”60 which Gardner 
interprets as expressing the idea of “just deserts,”61 also seems 
entirely consistent with utilitarian theories of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and perhaps incapacitation as well. Furthermore, to 
the extent that this passage implies the idea that punishments should 
be proportional, this characteristic is not unique to retributive 
justifications.62
 59. The Doctrine & Covenants is a canon of LDS scripture consisting primarily of 
revelations received by Joseph Smith between 1823 and 1843, along with several other central 
statements of doctrine. Section 134 is “[a] declaration of belief regarding governments and 
laws in general, adopted by unanimous vote at a general assembly of the church held at 
Kirtland, Ohio, August 17, 1835.” Doctrine & Covenants 134. 
 60. Id. at 134:8. 
 61. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 871. 
 62. Proportionality is widely desired on many theories of punishment. For instance, 
Bentham made clear that proportionality was important to his utilitarian theory of punishment. 
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 165–74 (Oxford 1996). Furthermore, although Justice Scalia is known for 
having opined in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991), that “[p]roportionality is 
inherently a retributive concept,” other aspects of his opinion in that case confirm that 
retribution has no monopoly on the ideal of proportionality. In particular, Justice Scalia also 
invoked what he called “[t]he New Hampshire proportionality provision, by far the most 
detailed” of numerous proportionality provisions found in early state constitutions, yet a 
provision that expressly justified punishment on utilitarian rather than retributivist grounds: 
“All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence. No wise 
legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, 
which they do to those of murder and treason; where the same undistinguishing 
severity is exerted against all offences; the people are led to forget the real distinction 
in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little 
compunction as they do those of the lightest dye: For the same reason a multitude 
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In particular, I adverted earlier to the idea that although society 
could employ utilitarian systems of punishment without the 
predicate of any true blameworthiness, such a system would be a 
house of cards.63 Once ordinary citizens learned that the victims of 
society’s punishment were not necessarily culpable, the utilitarian 
values derived from the punishment would rapidly evaporate. 
Utilitarian justifications of deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation also should all depend on punishing the actual 
wrongdoer, within the limits of “rough justice.”64 Thus, section 
134’s inclusion of an idea of blameworthiness in no way precludes it 
from serving primarily as a premise for utilitarian justifications of 
secular punishment.65
Likewise, section 42 of the Doctrine & Covenants, which appears 
to require church members, as a matter of religious obligation, to 
subject their colleagues to civil punishment, seems to me at least as 
amenable to a utilitarian interpretation as to the retributivist 
interpretation that Gardner ascribes to it. In particular, members of 
the community of Saints may have an obligation to see offenders 
among them punished according to secular law not to ensure that 
wrongdoers receive their “just deserts,”66 but rather purely as a 
secular ordering principle. In fact, at the time of section 42, church 
members may have felt this obligation particularly acutely, given that 
the church’s relationship to greater American society was quite 
of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all punishments 
being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind.”  
Id. at 978 n.8 (emphasis added) (quoting N.H. CONST. art. XVIII, pt. 1). 
 63. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 64. As previously discussed, see supra note 33, this approach is sometimes identified as a 
“mixed” approach, as “distributive retribution,” or as “negative retribution.” 
 65. Furthermore, as Gardner acknowledges, see Gardner, supra note 1, at 871 n.29, 872 
n.30, section 134 is replete with other language, not only elsewhere in verse 8 but also in 
verses 1 and 6, that clearly “addresses the virtues of the legal order in general utilitarian terms.” 
Id. at 872 n.30. Nor would verse 8 become “redundant,” id. at 871 n.29, if we also 
interpreted this verse primarily in utilitarian terms as well, for it then would be extending to 
the specific category of the criminal law verse 1’s much more general statement about the 
utilitarian purpose of all secular law to advance “the good and safety of society,” Doctrine & 
Covenants 134:1, while also adding the injunction that “all men” should involve themselves in 
criminal law enforcement, id. at 134:8. Finally, the possibility that a passage of scripture (as 
distinguished, for instance, from a legislative statute) might contain redundancies, even 
deliberate ones, should not be surprising. Rather, such scriptural redundancies are frequent and 
help lead to an interpretation in which all components are mutually reinforcing. 
 66. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 872–74. 
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tenuous.67 In any event, the passage’s support for a retributive theory 
is by no means obvious, as Gardner’s discussion itself 
acknowledges.68
Church President Brigham Young’s injunction to the church’s 
Municipal High Council to bring church members in fraud and theft 
cases to justice prior to the Nauvoo exodus69 out of a fear that they 
would otherwise go unpunished70 is also by no means clearly 
retributivist. Though the language of his statement is reminiscent of 
Kant’s claim that a society could not properly disband without first 
dispensing justice to all who deserved it,71 Brigham Young’s fear 
instead could have arisen from a much more pragmatic worry about 
“going into the wilderness alone”72 with groups of church members 
who remained ill-disposed towards one another because of 
unresolved legal disputes.73
Similarly, Elder Dallin Oaks’ recent statement that “the 
paramount concern of human law is justice”74 also does not 
 67. See generally LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON 
EXPERIENCE 44–82 (1979) (describing the persecutions of early church members between 
1832 and 1846 across Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois). 
 68. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 873–74. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that 
ecclesiastical sanctions “might be as effective as civil punishment” for deterrent (or other 
utilitarian) purposes, id. at 874, even at the time of section 42, when the insular church 
community often relied heavily on ecclesiastical courts. 
 69. In response to growing persecution, early members of the church, in 1846, hastily 
abandoned their thriving community on the banks of the Mississippi River at Nauvoo, Illinois, 
then the second largest city in Illinois, to begin the final stage of their westward migration to 
what would become the State of Deseret, precursor to the Utah Territory. See ARRINGTON & 
BITTON, supra note 67, at 69, 94–101, 162–63. 
 70. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 874. 
 71. See id. at 863–64 & n.8 (quoting KANT, supra note 11, at 102). 
 72. Id. at 874 (relating Brigham Young’s injunction as quoted in EDWIN BROWN 
FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS 361 (1988)). Here, 
“alone” did not mean unaccompanied, as Brigham Young was planning the exodus of an entire 
people, and instead may have been a euphemism for “without secular law or authority,” as the 
church members anticipated leaving U.S. law behind. 
 73. As a possible response to this concern, Gardner suggests that the LDS community 
could simply have left wrongdoers behind, after ecclesiastical court proceedings, without 
needing to impose civil punishments upon them. See id. at 874–75. Yet given that during this 
period church courts already routinely exercised ecclesiastical and civil authority, there is 
nothing unusual—nor necessarily retributive—in Young’s injunction that the courts continue 
to bring offenders to justice during the exodus. 
 74. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 876 (quoting DALLIN H. OAKS, THE LORD’S WAY 
217 (1991)). Dallin H. Oaks, formerly on the faculty of the University of Chicago Law School 
and president of Brigham Young University, now serves as a member of the church’s Quorum 
of the Twelve Apostles. 
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necessarily reflect a view that retribution should be the primary 
justification for secular punishment. Rather, it may simply mean that 
secular (“human”) law, to be valid in the eyes of the citizenry, must 
be regular, impartial, fair, and predicate its punishments upon 
principles of culpability and proportionality.75 In addition, Elder Neal 
Maxwell’s very recent remark about the tendency of many people 
today to confuse mercy and justice and “to shy away from correction 
even when it might be helpful”76 immediately suggests something 
quite different to me than approval of retributive theory, as Gardner 
reads it.77 Rather, this statement seems explicitly to recognize the 
rehabilitative value of punishment, and to encourage us to be much 
more welcoming of secular sanctions precisely because they can help 
us to learn our lessons.78
Indeed, the idea of rehabilitation infuses remarks made by the 
prophet Joseph Smith during his candidacy for President of the 
United States in 1844.79 He suggested that legislatures should 
“pardon every convict in their several penitentiaries, blessing them as 
they go, and saying to them . . . , ‘Go thy way and sin no more.’”80 
He urged that criminals, for their punishment, should be put to 
work on public projects  
 75. As noted above, that society places a high value on ensuring that the punishment fits 
the crime—in other words, that the distribution of punishment be based upon some 
“retributive” principle—does not necessarily mean that society’s primary justification for the 
imposition of punishment is retributive. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. Nor is 
a concern that punishments be proportional in order to be “just” necessarily retributive. See 
supra note 62. 
 76. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 875 (quoting Maxwell, supra note 55, at 12). Like 
Elder Oaks, Neal A. Maxwell, formerly on the faculty of the Political Science Department of 
the University of Utah, also serves as a member of the church’s Quorum of the Twelve 
Apostles. 
 77. See id. at 875–76 & n.42. 
 78. Gardner acknowledges this possible interpretation, but argues that punishment is 
“helpful” only “in addition to its other virtues.” Id. at 876 n.42 (emphasis omitted). 
 79. As president of the church, Smith canvassed likely candidates for President of the 
United States in the election of 1844 concerning their disposition towards the church. Not 
fully satisfied by any of their answers, Smith undertook his own candidacy from January 1844 
until his assassination in June 1844. In addition to calling for prison reform, his platform 
advocated revoking imprisonment for debt, abolishing slavery by 1850, establishing a national 
bank, and annexing Texas and Oregon. See CHURCH  EDUC. SYS., CHURCH HISTORY IN THE 
FULNESS OF TIMES 269–70 (1989). 
 80. 6 JOSEPH SMITH, JR., HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 205 (B.H. Roberts ed., 1950). 
These remarks are obviously reminiscent of Christ’s response to the woman taken in adultery, 
for whom the prescribed punishment under the Mosaic Law would have been stoning. See John 
8:1–11. 
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or any place where the culprit can be taught more wisdom and 
more virtue, and become more enlightened. Rigor and seclusion 
will never do as much to reform the propensities of men as reason 
and friendship . . . . Let the penitentiaries be turned into seminaries 
of learning, where intelligence . . . would banish such fragments of 
barbarism.”81  
These remarks, with their explicit emphasis on forgiveness and 
reform, rather than “desert,” seem fundamentally inconsistent with 
the idea that secular retribution is necessary in order for justice to be 
done. 
CONCLUSION 
I have confessed some sympathy for the idea that wrongdoing 
merits a sanction without regard to the resulting benefits to society. 
But I trace this feeling to an underlying belief that punishment may 
ultimately benefit the wrongdoer, and I fear that secular institutions 
are ill-equipped to dispense punishments on this basis alone. 
Furthermore, I see no necessity for them to do so. Instead, 
implications of the atonement, along with other aspects of LDS 
theology, reinforce in me a sense that from a theological standpoint, 
secular punishments are justified primarily by the way in which they 
help individuals to avoid or learn from error, and secondarily by the 
way that they help provide a stable society in which we all may more 
meaningfully exercise our agency. Regardless of whatever cosmic or 
eternal balancing ultimately may be required for our wrongdoing, 
the atonement will cover all but the smallest token contribution that 
we as individuals can make. Although we, in turn, may be expected 
to make these token contributions wherever we have the opportunity 
(including wherever our secular society requires them of us), we do 
so not in order to effectuate the retributive balancing of accounts. 
Rather, we do so both to help us “learn our lesson” and as an 
expression of the faith and gratitude necessary to effectuate the full 
gift of the atonement. 
 
 
 
 81. SMITH, supra note 80, at 205. 
